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Abstract
We examine the e¢ cacy of a popular anti-poverty programme namely, the
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) of the Government
of India. We argue that a chronic friction of wage payment delay in this
agship programme could adversely a¤ect the welfare of the poor through
two channels. First, it causes deferred consumption. Second, it turns labour
into a credit good which makes the indebted household work harder to clear
o¤ his existing debt. The loss of welfare persists even when the worker
has an outside employment option. If a programme of nancial inclusion
increases the indebtedness of the poor, a wage payment delay in the NREGA
programme could escalate this welfare loss although the o¢ cial indicator of
success (i.,e. participation) may not reveal this friction.
Keywords: NREGA, Employment Guarantee, Credit Good, Financial
Inclusion.
1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to analyze the welfare e¤ects of wage payment de-
lay in a popular employment guarantee programme in India known as the
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGA
hereafter). The issue is important because this programme has received in-
creasing attention in recent years as a workfare programme that targets the
poor (Lal et al. 2010, Subba Rao et al. 2013). A large literature has exam-
ined the e¢ cacy and welfare implications of such anti-poverty programmes
(Besley and Coate 1992, Dreze and Sen 1991, Lipton 1996, Ravallion 1991).
Basu, Chau and Kanbur (2009) provide deep theoretical insights about the
rationale for such an employment guarantee programme to alleviate fric-
tional unemployment originating from the private labour market due to low
labour productivity or high cost of job creation.
While there is no dispute that workfare programmes serve a useful role
in correcting private labour market frictions, what is less evident is how it
functions when there are persistent frictions in such programme itself. In
this paper, we focus on one such friction namely, the wage payment delay. A
key institutional bottleneck has been the signicant delay by the government
in processing timely wage payment of rural household workers. In principle,
workers are promised a payment of NREGA wages through nominated bank
accounts or post o¢ ce accounts within 14 days of completion of the public
works project (Government of India, 2013). In practice, workers face delays
in payment of wages upwards ranging from 30 to over 90 days.
In addition to the NREGA, the Government of India has almost simul-
taneously launched another major anti-poverty programme known as Jan
Dhan Yojana. The aim of this scheme is to provide the unbanked section
of the population wider access to banking and nancial services. Various
measures were undertaken by the Reserve Bank of India to lower the trans-
action and administrative costs for the poor to open savings accounts which
e¤ectively boosts the real rate of return on saving encouraging more saving.
Simultaneously there was greater proliferation of micro-nance institutions
(MFI) with an aim to provide multipurpose loans to the poor.
Little attention is devoted in the literature to understand the e¤ect of
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NREGA wage payment delay on the welfare of the poor particularly in a
policy environment of greater nancial inclusion of the poor. Our paper
precisely aims to address this question. Our study is motivated by two key
counter-intuitive stylized facts based on the district level data for India that
we report later. First, a higher payment delay is uniformly associated with
a greater NREGA participation. Second, NREGA participation responds
more positively to wage payment delay particularly in districts with greater
nancial inclusion.
Why is nancial inclusion of the poor an issue while assessing the e¢ cacy
and welfare implications of NREGA programme? While the aim of nancial
inclusion is to provide the poor wider access to nancial markets and reduce
their dependence on local money lenders, studies show mixed evidence about
the success of this programme across regions. During the same period when
the programme of nancial inclusion is in place, rural households indebt-
edness and default also increased accompanied with greater proliferation of
MFI. Greater default led to a rise in the borrowing cost of the households
giving rise to a vicious circle of poverty and indebtedness. The most re-
cent survey of agricultural households by the National Sample Survey O¢ ce
(NSSO) shows that about 51.9% agricultural households are considered to
fall in the indebted category (Sangwan 2015). One possible reason for such
increasing indebtedness is the increasing loan pushing by micronance orga-
nizations to poor rural farmers and the high interest rates charged on these
loans (Hulme and Maitrot 2014).
Using a stylized life cycle model, we demonstrate that if a nancial
inclusion elevates the indebtedness of the poor, it may induce the bor-
rower/worker to participate more in the NREGA programme to clear o¤
his debt burden and entangle him more in a poverty trap with onerous
workload. The underlying intuition of our key result stems from the fact
a payment delay makes labour a credit good. A longer payment lag low-
ers the present value of labour income ows because it lowers the discount
factor facing the household. The borrower/worker has to make a credible
promise to the lender to work harder to pay o¤ his debt. This raises his par-
ticipation in the NREGA programme. Greater disutility of work coupled
2
with deferred consumption lowers the steady state welfare and makes the
household worker worse-o¤.
A higher NREGA participation of rural workforce would then be a mis-
leading indicator of success of the workfare programme because it would
not necessarily reveal the welfare loss su¤ered by the asset-poor households
who face a formidable wage payment delay. The welfare assessment of em-
ployment guarantee of the poor in the presence of wage payment delay and
nancialization of the poor is new in the growing literature on workfare.1
In this respect our study is novel.
To check the robustness of our key theoretical result, we examine the
NREGA labour supply response of the poor when they have other employ-
ment options with no wage payment delay besides NREGA. We extend our
model to include a private labour market where the wage in the private
labour market is competitively determined. The outside employment op-
tion of the poor depends on the availability of such private jobs that could
vary between lean and peak seasons. In a lean season, when these private
employment opportunities dry up, the same positive relationship between
payment delay and workers NREGA participation of the asset poor house-
hold emerges. Despite the exibility of work allocation, households are still
worse o¤ in terms of welfare when payment delay is longer because it distorts
their work allocation decision.
Although the availability of private labour market options weakens the
relationship between payment delay and NREGA participation, in real-
ity poor households with low productivity have very limited outside op-
tions. Thus it is likely that asset-poor households would participate more
in NREGA when payment delay is longer to clear o¤ his debt burden.2
1Hereafter, we use the phrase nancialization and nancial inclusion of the poor syn-
onymously although there is a subtle di¤erence between these two policies which is not
pertinent for our analysis.
2Desai et al. (2015) document that poor are more likely to participate in NREGA.
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2 Evolution of Wage Payment Delay in NREGA
The NREGA is Indias main welfare programme for the rural poor and
the largest workfare programme in the world, covering 11 per cent of the
worlds population (Muralidharan et al. 2015). The programme started in
the nancial year 2005-2006 and was rolled out in phases. Initially restricted
to the 200 poorest districts of India in 2006, it was extended to 130 more
districts in 2007 and to all districts in the country in 2008. The allocation of
the Indian Government to the program in nancial year 2013-2014 was USD
5.5 billon, or 7.9 per cent of the governments budget. The programme has
uneven success across the country (Banerji et al. 2014, Desai et al. 2015).
Under the programme, there is no eligibility requirements as the manual
nature of the work involved is expected to lead of the poor into program
participation (Besley and Coate 1992). Participating households obtain job
cards, which are issued by the local Gram Panchayat (GP, or village o¢ ce).
Once issued a job card, workers can apply at will to the local GP or block
o¢ ce, the lowest and next lowest units in the administrative hierarchy. O¢ -
cials are legally obligated to provide work on projects within 5 kilometres of
the workers home. The projects vary greatly, though road construction and
irrigation earthworks predominate (Niehaus and Sukhtankar 2013). House-
holds work in NREGA projects at stipulated wages set at the state level.
The supply of labour from the household for NREGA project occurs mostly
in the lean (dry) season, when alternate private sector casual jobs are not
available, while it tails o¤ in the peak (rainy) season (Imbert and Papp
2015).3 The administration of the projects is run by the key o¢ cials of GP
who are the elected Sarpanch (or village leader) and the appointed Pan-
chayat Secretary. Project work-sites are managed by o¢ cials called Field
Assistants, who record attendance and output on muster rolls and send
these to the sub-district for digitization, from where the work records are
sent to the state level, which triggers the release of funds to pay workers.
In the rst two years of the programme, payments to workers were often
3According to the 2007-2008 National Sample Survey of the Indian government, rural
adults spend on average 1.5 per cent of their time on public works during the lean season
and less than 0.5 per cent of time during the peak season.
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made in cash in several states in India. Under the system of cash payments,
wages were paid by the same agency that was responsible for implement-
ing the NREGA (that is, the GP), leading to the embezzlement of funds,
with corrupt o¢ cials able to inate muster roll entries and retain the funds
that were supposed to be paid to workers (Khera 2010). However, in re-
sponse to widespread media coverage of corruption in NREGA, in 2008 the
Government of India instructed state government to move to a system of
wage payments through bank or post o¢ ce accounts set up for workers (Ad-
hikari and Bhatia 2010). The immediate rationale for the shift to payments
through banks and post o¢ ces was to make sure that an independent nan-
cial institution is responsible for payments to workers without any outside
interference. Finally, an important complementary objective of the shift to
payments through banks was to include rural workers in the formal nancial
sector in order to develop their saving propensity for the future. Therefore,
the switch from cash to bank payments was seen by the Government of In-
dia as the worlds largest nancial inclusion scheme(Government of India
2015).
However, the shift from the cash to bank payments unfortunately led to
long and variable payment delays to workers (Khera 2010). Initially this
delay was due to the huge surge in the number of accounts that had to be
opened in banks and post o¢ ces for NREGA workers. A complex bureau-
cratic system then emerged in the approval of payments. Lists of wage pay-
ments of individual workers are prepared by the Field Assistants in charge
of the projects. O¢ cers at the block and district (the next highest level
of the administrative hierarchy after the block) then approve the payments
list, which then goes to the bank o¢ cer (at the state or central level) who
processes the payment, transferring the payment due to the worker from the
GPs bank account to the workers bank account (usually the workers and
GPs account are in the same bank). Delays occur at every each stage of the
payment process with GPs entirely dependent on higher level functionaries
to push funds into their accounts (Banerjee et al. 2014). In 2013-2014, 43
days was the average time it took for workers to receive their wages on com-
pletion of their projects, far exceeding the stipulated time prescribed by the
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Government of India of 14 days (our calculations, from the data obtained
from www.mgnrega.nic.in).4
3 Payment Delay, Financial Inclusion and NREGA
Participation: Some Stylized Facts
In this section, we examine the relationship between household labour supply
for the NREGA and the wage payment delay. The role of nancial inclusion
in mediating this relationship is also examined. Data for household labour
supply for the NREGA (i.e. NREGA participation) come from the NREGA
data portal of the Government of India (website: www.nrega.nic.in).
Financial inclusion is a multi-dimensional notion and thus various def-
initions can be found in the literature.5 Given the caveat that there is no
unambiguous measure of nancial inclusion, we use the o¢ cial Crisil index
as a proxy of such nancial inclusion.6 To measure nancial inclusion, we
use the composite score of nancial inclusion calculated for most districts
in India by the Indian credit rating agency, Crisil, for the year 2011 (Crisil,
2013). This measure goes from 0 (low nancial inclusion) to 100 (high -
nancial inclusion) and is a simple average of three sub-indicators: a) degree
of bank penetration in the district; b) degree of credit penetration; and c)
degree of deposit penetration (Crisil 2013). The measure captures both the
borrowing and saving dimension of nancial inclusion. That is, the measure
is higher when more households borrow from the formal nancial system,
and/or when more households save in the formal banking system. After
matching the Crisil data with the NREGA participation and wage pay-
4The delay in the payment of wages is particularly evident in the poorer states of India,
due to a weak institutional environment in these states. For example, in Bihar, during
the nancial year 2013-14, 24 per cent of payment transactions were delayed over 90 days
and 50 per cent of payments were delayed by more than 14 days.
5See Nair and Tankha (2014) for a comprehensive list of denitions.
6The degree of bank penetration is measured by the number of bank branches and num-
ber of loan accounts, per hundred thousand population; the degree of credit penetration
is measured by the number of small borrower loan accounts and number of agricultural
advances, per hundred thousand population; and the degree of depositor penetration is
measured by saving deposit accounts, per hundred thousand population.
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ment data, we have observations for 498 districts in all 15 major Indian
states spanning the period 2012-14.
Figure 1 plots the kernel density of NREGA participation of all districts
in our sample. The median proportion of participating households among
total households registered for the scheme in a given district is 0.30, with a
minimum of 0.03, a maximum of 0.82, and a standard deviation of 0.17.
Figure 1: NREGA participation of a sample of 498 Districts in 15 Indian
States
Data on wage payment delay also came from the Government of Indias
NREGA data portal, and is only available for most districts for 2013-2014.
For each district, the NREGA data portal provides the number of trans-
actions delayed by days of delay, in the interval classes: delay in payment
between 15 to 30 days, 30 to 45 days, 45 to 60 days, 60 to 90 days and over
90 days. We compute the average expected delay in payment by taking the
average of the midpoints of the interval classes, weighted by the proportion
of transactions in each interval class in total NREGA transactions in the
district.7
7We also use value of transactions in each interval class instead of number of transac-
tions as the weights to calculate expected delay in payment and get no di¤erence in our
results.
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Figure 2 plots the probability of such delayed payments based on the
same sample of districts. The median probability of delay (more than 15
days) of all the payments based on district level estimation is about 50%.
Figure 2: Probability of Payment Delay for 15 states in India, 2012-14.
To explore the relationship between household participation in the NREGA
and expected delay in receiving NREGA wages, we run the following regres-
sion:
di = a0 + a1WPi + a2Zi + ui (1)
where di is the proportion of households in the ith district participating in
the NREGA among total households registered for the scheme8; WPi is the
delay in NREGA wage payments, Zi is a vector of controls, and ui is the
error term.
We include the control set Zi in (1) that may inuence household NREGA
participation at the district level. The most important of these factors would
be rainfall variation across districts. Household participation in the NREGA
8Not all households who register for the scheme (that is, obtain a job card) do so
with the intention of working in the NREGA. Job cards are seen as another form of
government identity and by 2013, a signicant proportion of rural households, including
non-poor households, had obtained job cards (Desai et al. 2015).
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is likely to be higher in districts of India short of rainfall where agricultural
activities are not protable, leading to low private demand for agricultural
labour (Dasgupta 2014). To capture rainfall variations across districts, we
construct an index which captures rainfall in the district and is constructed
from the precipitation data available from the Center for Climatic Research
at the University of Delaware. The data include monthly precipitation val-
ues at 0.5-degree intervals in latitude and longitude. To match these data at
the district level, the nearest latitude-longitude to each district head quarter
is taken. We take the long-term (19902008) average district-level rainfall
in the monsoon months of July-September.
In addition to the rainfall variable, we include state-level xed e¤ects
to capture large di¤erences across Indian states that have been observed in
the implementation of the NREGA (Imbert and Papp 2015).9 Finally, we
include a battery of district-level controls that capture the level of village
infrastructure and social backwardness that would be correlated with district
level economic activity and local private demand as well as the ease at
which poor agricultural households may be able to nd outside work in the
private labour market. These measures are the proportion of villages in total
inhabited villages with drinking water, electricity, on a bus route, with paved
roads, and with a post and telegraph o¢ ce. Social backwardness variables
are the proportion of households which are Scheduled Castes, proportion of
households which are Scheduled Tribes, and the proportion of total workers
which are marginal workers. Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are
among the poorest in India (Gang et al. 2008), and the Government of India
specically targeted these households for NREGA work. Marginal workers
are agricultural labourers, who are the poorest occupational group in India,
and in need of NREGA work the most (Roy 2015). All the village variables
are obtained from the 2001 Census of India, while the social backwardness
variables are obtained from the 2011 Census of India.
9Seven Indian states are seen as top performers; these being Andhra Pradesh, Chhatis-
garh, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttarkhand and Tamil Nadu. Dif-
ferences in state-level implementation can be explained by a combination of factors such as
political will, existing administrative capacity and previous experience in providing public
works (Imbert and Papp 2015).
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Next, we examine whether the relationship between NREGA participa-
tion and wage payment delay would di¤er by the level of nancial inclusion
in the district. Denoting nancial inclusion index as F , districts with F
greater than the median F are labelled as "high nancial inclusion districts
and remaining districts are deemed to be "low nancial inclusion" category.
We then run separate regressions (1) for these two subsamples of districts
to see if the coe¢ cient on wage payment delay, WP, di¤ers by the level of
nancial inclusion of the district.
Table 1 reports the salient regression results. In Col. (1), we present
an estimate of equation (1) with only state xed e¤ects as controls. We
treat payment delay as an exogenous variable as we have seen in the earlier
section that it is mostly caused by bureaucratic ine¢ ciencies at the district
level.. The coe¢ cient of the expected delay in wage payment is positive and
signicant at the 1 per cent level. In Col. (2), we introduce rainfall as an
additional control, and in Col. (3), we introduce all other controls. The
sign and signicance on the wage payment variable does not change in these
two augmented specications. The regression results reported in Col. (4)
and (5) refer to high and low nancial inclusion districts. The coe¢ cient of
wage payment is positive and signicant for the high nancial inclusion
districts but is insignicant for the low nancial inclusiondistricts. This
suggests that the positive relationship between participation in the NREGA
and wage payment delay holds mostly for nancially included districts.
In sum: two stylized facts emerge from our empirical exercise based on
district level data. First, households participate more in NREGA projects
in districts with a higher probability of wage payment delay. Second, it is
more likely in districts with higher levels of nancial inclusion. In the next
section, we develop a simple life cycle model to understand these empirical
regularities.
<Insert Table 1>
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4 The Model
Consider an economy where the rural household receives a stationary en-
dowment (nonlabour income), yi each period. The household receives util-
ity from consumption, cit and su¤ers disutility from work e¤ort. l
i
t . The
household has an option to work for NREGA at a xed contract wage w
or not to work and consume the endowment every period. We call lit the
labour supply in NREGA. In this baseline model we assume that besides
NREGA there is no private labour market option available to the house-
hold. The only outside option besides work is to fall back on consuming
the endowment yi: Similar to Kollmann (2002) let the instantaneous utility
function be ln(cit  
 
c)  Alit where
 
c = subsistence consumption.10 There
is a k-period delay in the wage payment for the NREGA service that the
household renders at date t. If k = 1; it means no delay. Households labour
supply is thus a credit good.
Participation in NREGA provides the rural household an access to a
bank account which means that in principle all households have an access
to the credit market to borrow or lend at a riskfree interest rate r: The
household solves the following maximization problem:
Max
1X
t=0
t
h
ln(cit  
 
c) Alit
i
(2)
.
cit + b
i
t(1 + r) = y
i + wlit k+1 + b
i
t+1 (3)
lit 
 
l
Note that bit+1 = the new loans of the household at date t, r is the interest
rate which is assumed to be the same as (1=)  1.11
 
l is the upper limit to
10We assume that labour is supplied at an extensive margin which means that lit is
the number of household members participating in the NREGA programme supplying a
xed number of work hours. Greater household participation takes household members
away from home production which lowers the households direct utility. This explains why
labour appears with a negative sign in the direct utility function. In the appendix, we
also work out the case of labour supply at an intensive margin.
11To ensure a steady state, hereafter we assume that the rate of time preference is the
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NREGA work stipulated by the government. Let bi0 be initial indebtedness
of the household. We also assume a no-Ponzi game condition which rules
out an exploding debt.
The steady state consumption and labour supply functions given by the
following proposition.12
Proposition 1 The steady state consumption and labour supply depends on
the payment lag and the initial level of indebtedness of the household (and
is characterized as:
ci(k) = [
 
c +A 1k 1w] (4)
li(k) = min
"
 
l ;
(
(
 
c   yi)
(1  )
( k   1)
w
+
1  k
(1  )A +
bi0(1  k)
kw
)#
(5)
Proof: Appendix.
It is straightforward to verify from (5) the following key result.
Proposition 2 If yi <
 
c and bi0 > 0, rural poor participate more in the
NREGA programme in response to a longer payment delay.
If the adult is income and asset poor in the sense that his non-labour
income yi is less than his subsistence consumption,
 
c , and bi0 > 0, he has
to participate in NREGA to meet his ends because he has no other outside
employment option. The present value of labour income given that there is
a payment lag k is given by:
wli(k)
(1 + r)k 1

1 +
1
(1 + r)k
+
1
(1 + r)2k
+
1
(1 + r)3k
+ :::::1

A longer payment lag (k) means that the present value of this wage income
ows is lower. If the worker/borrower has an outstanding debt bi0 to repay,
same as the rate of interest.
12Alternative paths of labour supply can also be equilibrium. However, we only focus
on a steady state path of li:
12
he has to exert higher work e¤ort to clear o¤ this debt burden.13 Simi-
lar reasoning applies to understand why households with low income (yi)
participate more in NREGA.
The key result that an income and asset poor household supplies more
labour in response to a longer payment delay in the steady state is robust
when the household chooses labour at an intensive margin. The appen-
dix works out the case when the household supplies labour at an intensive
margin.14
4.1 Welfare e¤ects of an increase in payment lag
The steady state welfare is function of payment lag (k) which we call W i(k)
as follows15:
W i(k) =
1
1  

ln(A 1w) + (k   1) ln  Ali(k) (6)
The comparative statics e¤ect of a change in k on the life time welfare of
the household is:
W i0(k) =
1
1  

ln  Ali0(k)
Since li0(k) > 0 for the poor with a below subsistence income (from propo-
sition 2), W i0(k) is unambiguously negative. We summarize this key result
as follows.
Proposition 3 If yi <
 
c and bi0 > 0; the payment delay unambiguously
lowers the steady state welfare of borrower/households.
13 It is straightforward to work out the solution of no payment delay when k = 1 which
are as follows:
ci =
 
c +A 1w
li =
 
c   yi
w
+
1
A
+
rbi0
w
In the absence of payment labour supply is independent of the interest rate because the
household does not su¤er this adverse wealth e¤ect because household does not capitalize
the labour income.
14The key result that a longer payment delay does not necessarily rest on the assumption
that yi <
 
c: In the following section, the sensitivity analysis also conrms the same result.
15To obtain (6), plugging (4) and (5) into (2).
13
4.2 Debt, NREGA Participation and Welfare
The positive relationship between payment delay and NREGA participation
is based more on the assumption that the households initial asset position
is negative than the fact that his non-labour income is insu¢ cient to cover
his subsistence consumption. Figures 3 and 4 plot the relationship between
payment delay and the NREGA participations of two households i and j
who di¤er in asset status, namely bi0 = 100 and b
j
0 =  5 respectively, with
yi = yj >
 :
c .16 The household/borrower increases his labour supply in
response to longer payment lag. On the other hand, the household/lender
increases NREGA participation. Once the payment lag exceeds 2 periods, he
cuts back NREGA participation and falls back more on his outside options
of non-labour income and asset income to smooth consumption.
payment delay
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Figure 3: Payment delay and labour supply of a borrower worker
16For the sake of illustration, we set the parameters as follows:  = 0:95 which means
steady state real interest rate of 5%; w=10,
 
c = 1; yi == yj = 1:5; A=10. These
parameters are xed to get an interior solution for plausible labour supply. The direction
of comparative statics reported in Figures 3 through 6 are robust to alternative choices of
parameter values except the level of debt bi0 and the interest rate, r.
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Payment delay and labour supply of lender households
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Figure 5: Payment delay and steady state welfare
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Figure 5 plots the corresponding changes in welfare of these two types of
households. A longer payment lag taxes the labour income of all households
and thus everybody su¤ers welfare loss. However, the borrower/ house-
hold su¤ers most because of his greater workload in response to payment
delay. The lender/household su¤ers welfare loss primarily due to deferred
consumption.
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Figures 6 and 7 plot the same relationships for two di¤erent interest rates
for the borrower/household only. Higher interest rate by raising the adults
debt retirement cost raises the labour supply and lowers his steady state
welfare. This happens progressively more for longer payment lag because
the annuity value of wage payment goes down more sharply as the payment
lag increases.
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Payment delay and labour supply of borrower households
at different interest rates
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Payment delay and steady state welfare of borrower households
at different interest rates
r=5%
r=10%
The upshot of this exercise is that a longer payment delay makes the
borrower/household work longer in the employment. These households suf-
fer an accelerated welfare loss as payment delay rises. The lender households
su¤er less in terms of welfare due to his outside asset income as a cushion.
4.3 Alternative employment option
How does the labour supply behaviour of the adult change when he has an
option to work for a non-NREGA job which has no payment delay? Let the
labour supply for such a non-NREGA job be nit: Let
 
n be the exogenously
given availability of such non-NREGA jobs. The production function facing
this sector is given by a simple Cobb-Douglas form, znit
 with 0 <  < 1
and z is the exogenous total factor productivity in the non-NREGA sec-
tor. Without loss of generality, replace the non-labour income yi from the
previous model by the income from non-NREGA employment. The wage
~
w
i
earned by the ith household in such a non-NREGA job is determined by
the prot maximizing risk neutral private employers.
The household now solves:
17
Max
1X
t=0
t[ln(cit  
 
c) A(lit + nit)] (7)
cit + b
i
t(1 + r)  ewinit + wlit k+1 + bit+1 (8)
lit 
 
l (9)
nit 
 
n (10)
The rst order conditions dictate the same consumption function (4) as
before. The optimal stationary work allocation between non-NREGA and
NREGA occupations are given by:17
Non-NREGA : ni(k) = min
"
 
n;

z
k 1w
1=(1 )#
(11)
NREGA: li(k) = min
24 l ;
 
c   ewini(k)( k   1)
(1  )w +
1  k
(1  )A +
bi0(1  k)
kw
35
(12)
Given that there is a payment delay in the NREGA sector, the non-
NREGA labour supply is determined by the arbitrage condition
~
w
i
= z(nit)
 1 =
k 1w allowing for corner solution. The non-NREGA labour supply does
not depend on households asset position while the NREGA participation
does. As in Basu et al. (2009) lower TFP (z) in the non-NREGA sector
boosts NREGA participation by lowering the non-NREGA wage. On the
other hand, a greater payment delay (k) has an ambiguous e¤ect on NREGA
participation; li(k): Since ni(k) is rising in k; the wage income from non-
NREGA is also increasing in k.18 This gives rise to a substitution e¤ect that
discourages NREGA participation in response to a higher k. On the other
hand, a higher k lowers the present value of deferred wages from NREGA
17The derivation is relegated to the Appendix.
18To see it, note that wage income from non-NREGA is given by: ewini(k) =
(wk 1) =(1 ):(z)1=(1 ):which is increasing in k:
18
that encourages the worker to work more in both sectors via an adverse
wealth e¤ect. The strength of this wealth e¤ect depends heavily on the
size of the household debt (bi0). The e¤ect of an increase in k on NREGA
participation is not obvious.
The NREGA labour supply response of the household to payment delay
now crucially depends on the availability of outside labour market options
which is given by
 
n and his credit status (bi0). For the sake of illustration,
we set
 
n = 2 for the lean season and
 
n = 8 for the peak season. The rest of
the parameters are kept the same as before. Figures 8 and 9 compare the
households labour supply responses in a lean season when the credit status
di¤ers. In a lean season due to insu¢ cient private labour market opportu-
nities, both borrower and lender households participate more in NREGA in
response to longer payment lag. On the other hand, the creditor/household
hits a corner solution of entirely shunning the NREGA work and working
fullest to non-NREGA jobs to smooth his consumption.
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Figure 8
Payment delay and labour supply,
of a borrower in a lean season
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Figure 9
Payment delay and labour supply,
of a lender in a lean season
NREGA labour
Non-NREGA labour
Figures 10 and 11 repeat the same experiment for the peak season. here
both borrower and lender households behave similarly by increasing labour
supply in both sectors as payment delay is longer. The response of the lender
to payment delay is less due to the asset cushion.19
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Figure 10
Payment delay and labour supply,
of a borrower in a peak season
NREGA labour
Non-NREGA labour
19Not surprisingly giving greater asset position to the lender weakens his NREGA labour
supply response to payment delay.
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Figure 11
Payment delay and labour supply,
of a lender in a peak season
NREGA labour
Non-NREGA labour
Table 2 reports the steady state welfare of the households in lean and
peak periods according to their credit status and payment delay.20 In both
lean and peak seasons the welfare loss due to payment delay is signicantly
higher for the borrower in contrast with the lender households.
<Table 2 comes here>
In sum: if rural households have alternative employment options, the
relationship between payment lag and NREGA labour supply response does
not change much. Borrower household certainly increases labour supply to
the NREGA when payment delay is longer. The labour supply response of
the lender is sluggish. Both also experience greater loss of welfare due to
payment delay.
4.4 Connecting to Stylized Facts
How does the model shed light on the two stylized facts reported in section
2? The key prediction of the model is that a borrower/household is likely to
participate more in the NREGA to clear o¤his existing debt. This prediction
holds in reasonably general environments which include outside employment
20The steady state welfare of the household in this case is given by: W i1(k) =
1
1 

ln(A 1w) + (k   1) ln  A(li(k) + ni(k) :
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options barring the case of peak seasons when greater private employment
opportunities are available. Given that the NREGA programme is primarily
targeted to poor and these programmes mostly help the poor in a slack sea-
son when outside employment options are less, our model is quite consistent
with the rst stylized fact.
The model has mixed implications about the second stylized fact. The
goal of nancial inclusion of the poor is to provide them a wider access to
nancial market and lower the borrowing cost by reducing their dependence
on local money lenders who charge exorbitant interest rate. Our model
implies that a lower borrowing cost would reduce NREGA participation
because poor have to work less to retire the debt if the interest cost is
lower. This could be welfare improving for the poor as well because it lowers
the disutility of work. On the other hand, our model also predicts that
income-poor households with greater indebtedness are likely to participate
more in the NREGA programme. If nancial inclusion of the poor actually
elevates the indebtedness of the poor and if an NREGA programme with a
formidable wage payment delay is in place, our model predicts that a higher
steady state debt burden would raise poors participation in the programme
to their detriment in terms of welfare. In this respect, our model is also
consistent with the second stylized fact.
5 Conclusion
There is no dispute that an employment guarantee programme such as
NREGA is a potentially useful anti-poverty measure to ameliorate the fric-
tional unemployment arising from private labour markets, What is less obvi-
ous is how it helps the poor when such an employment guarantee programme
has frictions of its own. In this paper, we focus on one such friction which
is the wage payment delay. Our stylized facts based on district level data
of India suggest that the NREGA participation actually responds positively
to such a payment lag. This may misleadingly suggest that payment lag
is not posing a threat to the e¢ cacy of the workfare programme in India.
We demonstrate in terms of a stylized life cycle model that an asset poor
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household without any outside employment option has no choice but to work
harder in response to such a longer payment lag. This happens because a
payment delay makes labour a credit good and the value of labour as an
asset declines due to a longer payment lag. The household-borrower works
harder to make a credible promise to the lender to pay o¤ the existing debt
obligations. The increased disutility of work and the deferred consumption
due to longer payment lag make the household worker worse o¤. Although
the o¢ cial indicators of success of NREGA programme do not necessarily
reveal this welfare loss of the poor, the anti-poverty goal of the workfare
programme is defeated when payment delay is present. If a programme of
nancial inclusion raises rural indebtedness, a payment delay may compound
the adverse welfare e¤ect on the poor. The welfare loss resulting from the
interaction of longer wage payment delay in NREGA and nancialization
of poor is robust when private labour market opportunities exist. The pol-
icy recommendation is the immediate reduction of the payment lag before
implementing the nancialization programme.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of proposition 1
The Lagrangian of the problem is given by:
Lp =
1X
t=0
t[ln(cit  
 
c) Alit] +
1X
t=0
t

yi + wlit k+1 + b
i
t+1   cit   bit(1 + r)

+
1X
t=0
t[
 
l   lit] (A.1)
where ftg and ft} are the sequence of lagrange multipliers associated with
the ow budget constraints and the inequality constraints. The rst order
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conditions are given by:
@Lp
@cit
=
t
cit  
 
c
  t = 0 (A.2)
@Lp
@lit
=  At + t+k 1w   t = 0 (A.3)
@Lp
@bit+1
=  t + t+1(1 + r) = 0 (A.4)
Assuming an interior solution (t = 0), use of (A.2) and (A.3) and yields
At =
wt+k 1
ct+k 1    c
which solves
ct+k 1 =
 
c +
wk 1
A
(A.5)
Assuming the steady state condition (1 + r) = 1;use of (A.2) and (A.4)
yields cit = c
i
t+1 for all t which after plugging into (A.5) yields the following
stationary consumption policy
c(k) =
 
c +
wk 1
A
(A.6)
In other words, the consumption is stationary because it does not depend on
time but only on the payment lag, k: Using the ow budget constraint (3) re-
cursively forward from date 0 and using the optimal stationary consumption
function (4), one gets (assuming no-Ponzi game condition):
 bi0 1 +
yi
1   + 
k 1wl(k)
h
1 + k + 2k + 3k + :::::1
i
=
"
 
c +
k 1w
A
#
:
1
1  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which can be further simplied as
 bi0 1 +
yi
1   +
k 1wl(k)
1  k =
"
 
c +
k 1w
A
#
:
1
1  
to get the expression in the curly bracket in (5). The expression for li(k)
written in (5) takes into account the possibility of a corner solution when the
household desires to work longer than the limit (
 
l ) set by the government.
A.2 Case of labour supply at an intensive margin
In this section, we analyze the case when the household supplies labour at an
intensive margin. For simplication, we ignore the non-NREGA employment
option of the household and assume that the non-labour income is exogenous
again. The household now solves the following maximization problem.
Max
1X
t=0
t[ln(cit  
 
c) +B ln(1  hit)] (A.7)
s.t.
cit + b
i
t(1 + r) = y
i + whit k+1 + b
i
t+1 (A.8)
where hit is labour hours which is a choice variable because the household
now makes a choice of labour at the intensive margin.
Given the steady state assumption that (1 + r) = 1, it is easy to ver-
ify from the Euler equation that the steady state consumption and labour
supply depend only on the payment lag k and is subject to the following
restriction:
ci(k) =
 
c + k 1B 1w(1  hi(k)) (A.9)
Substitution of (A.9) in the life time budget constraint of the household
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with no-Ponzi game condition yields:
hi(k) =
 kbi0 + (
 
c   yi)=f(1  )k 1g+ wB 1(1  ) 1
w
h
1
1 k +
1
B(1 )
i (A.10)
It is easy to verify that @h
i
@k > 0 if b
i
0 > 0 and
 
c   yi > 0 meaning hi(k) is
unambiguously increasing in k for poor indebted households: Thus greater
payment delay increases labour supply.
Substitution of (A.9) in (A.10) yields the optimal consumption policy.
Unlike the previous model, the consumption is not invariant to income.
Since hi(k) is increasing in k, ci(k) is decreasing in k. Thus the steady
state welfare is decreasing in k. The key conclusion that a payment delay
could increase the NREGA participation of the household member and make
him worse o¤ is thus a robust result which continues to hold in the case of
this model where the household supplies labour at an intensive margin.
A.3 Proof of eqs (11) and (12)
The lagrangian of the problem is given by:
Lp1 =
1X
t=0
t[ln(cit  
 
c) A(lit + nit)] +
1X
t=0
t

yi + ewtnit + wlit k+1 + bit+1   cit   bit(1 + r)
+
1X
t=0
t[
 
l   lit] +
1X
t=0
t[
 
n  nit] (A.11)
where t is the lagrange multiplier associated with the inequality constraint
(10).
The rst order conditions are given by:
@Lp
@cit
=
t
cit  
 
c
  t = 0 (A.12)
@Lp
@lit
=  At + t+k 1w   t = 0 (A.13)
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@Lp
@nit
=  At + t ewt   t = 0 (A.14)
@Lp
@bit+1
=  t + t+1(1 + r) = 0 (A.15)
Using (A.13) and (A.14), and assuming an interior solution, one solves for
nit as in the curly bracket of ((11). The expression in (11) takes into account
the possibility of a corner solution.
Using the same line of reasoning as in the proof of proposition, one can
verify that the expression of li(k) as in (12).
Finally, it is straightforward to verify from (A.12), (A.13) and (A.15)
that the stationary solution for consumption is the same as (A.9). //
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Table 1: Payment Delay, Financial Inclusion and NREGA Participation:
Key Findings
Col. (1) Col. (2) Col. (3) Col. (4) Col. (5)
WP i 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.0002
Rainfall included? No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-square 0.63 0.63 0.67 0.75 0.61
No of Observations 498 498 453 177 276
Method of Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Note: a) Dependent variable is proportion of households participating in NREGA.
The unit of analysis is the district; b) Col. (3), (4) and (5): Other controls include
measures of private labour demand at the district level. c) Cols. (4) and (5): Re-
sults for the high nancial inclusion districts are presented in Col. (4) and the
results for the low nancial inclusion districts are presented in Col. (5); e) ** and
***: signicant at 5 and 1 percent levels respectively; OLS= ordinary least squares
f) All estimates with robust standard errors.
Table 2: Payment lag and Steady State Welfare of Households in Lean and
Peak Seasons
k 1 2 3 4 5
Lean Seasons
W bor row er -27.1913 -34.6558 -42.4130 -50.4831 -58.8873
W lender -21.6650 -23.3123 -24.9462 -26.5707 -28.1900
Peak Seasons
W bor row er -55.1942 -66.2648 -77.8955 -90.1268 -103.0013
W lender -49.6679 -54.9213 -60.4287 -66.2143 -72.3040
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